VSP Public Comment

Should Calfornia reject the proposed Diebold system? Vote=Yes

Re Proposed "Separate Sheet Requirement":

I agree with all the other Citizen Proposed Requirements, but I believe that continuous
form paper (8 1/2 x 11) provides better accountability. I do NOT agree that the proposed
Diebold paper is an adequate substitute.

Re Central Tabulating Systems:

(1) It is impossible to have a verified secure Central Tabulating System which is
connected via a line to outside data sources UNLESS there is a second, independent, NON-
ERASABLE, NON-PROGRAMMABLE data recording system which captures ALL input transmitted into
the Central Tabulating System. This device should also have an "in use" light to show when
it is physically recording data. The transmission record can be reviewed later to assure
that no un-authorized data was transmitted into the system.

(2) It is ESSENTIAL for verifiability that NO CLOSED SOURCE SYSTEMS be allowed to operate
in ANY PART of the electoral process. ALL CODE must be verifiable by independent State
electoral employees. Commercial concerns for security can be accomodated by non-disclosure
agreements, but the supremacy of the electoral process MUST trump vendor demands in this
area. If a vendor is unwilling to do this, then other vendors will.

Re Electoral Official Impartiality:

(1) No State or County electoral officials or consultants should be allowed to serve in
any official or business capacity for any political party. Indeed, such service is in
direct opposition to the goal of impartiality in the electoral process. This should be
enacted into law with a penalty of fine or imprisionment or both for its violation. This
provision would not apply to committees or consulting groups composed of individuals from
all parties.

Re Certification of Election Software and Machines:

(1) The State should itself certify software and machines by examining the source code and
compiled code and testing the machines, or else by contracting with competent, independent
consultants to do so. If the latter, proof should be given that in fact detailed code-
review work was done, and proof of comprerhensive testing should be submitted. In
particular, examinations for subterfuges, traps, and date-and-time dependent code
executions should be conducted as well as simple arithmetic accuracy.

(2) No uncertified software or machine should be allowed use in any election.

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Citizen Proposed Standards:

The AVVPAT shall be printed on single sheet non-thermal at least 16 pound paper, one
record of vote per sheet.

Every recorded vote, no matter how recorded, shall have a AVVPAT copy.

The AVVPAT record of the vote shall be printed in a minimum of 12 point font.

The AVVPAT shall be printed and organized to be easily read by both the voter and election officials.

The AVVPAT during the 1% manual audit and any recount shall be physically verified and hand counted only.

The recorded vote choices on the AVVPAT shall not be audited or recounted by automatic or electronic methods.

There shall not be a method by which any particular voting record can be connected to any particular voter.

Any AVVPAT spoiled or rejected by a voter because of a voting system error shall not be counted as a spoiled ballot under the two spoiled ballots limit.

No remote access to voting machines by wireless or internet.